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Thank you very much.  It’s a great pleasure to speak at SIEPR’S first annual State of the 
West Symposium.  I’ve been asked to give my views on the economy, both in the 12th Federal 
Reserve district, which covers the western part of the country from Guam to Idaho, and for the 
nation as a whole, as well as explain what the Federal Reserve is doing to meet its mandates of 
maximum employment and price stability at this juncture.  Economic policy can be controversial 
and debate about it heated.  I would like to present myself as an embodiment of the principle that 
even the fiercest rivals can at times achieve a meeting of the minds.  I am a product of both UC 
Berkeley—where I got my bachelor’s degree—and Stanford, where I earned my Ph.D.  I’ve 
managed to benefit from my training in economics at these two institutions, which can have such 
starkly different views of the world, and I’ve learned to appreciate the ideas of scholars even 
when I disagree with them.  But one problem remains: I still don’t know which side of the 
stadium to sit on at the Big Game.  And now for a disclaimer: I should stress that my comments 
represent my own views and not necessarily those of my Federal Reserve colleagues. 
During the past few years, giving talks about the economy has been sobering at best and 
depressing at worst.  Thankfully, things are looking considerably brighter now.  That’s because, 
after what was perhaps the worst recession of the postwar era and a recovery that proceeded in 
fits and starts, the economy finally seems to be attaining escape velocity.  That is to say, the 
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recovery appears increasingly to be becoming self-sustaining, driven primarily by private-sector 
demand rather than relying so much on government support. 
  Even though we have achieved liftoff, we are by no means rocketing to the moon.  I 
would characterize the outlook for growth as solid, but not spectacular.  The Commerce 
Department last week reported that real, inflation-adjusted gross domestic product grew at a 3.2 
percent annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2010, up from 2.6 percent in the previous quarter.  In 
fact, the headline GDP number considerably understates the economy’s forward momentum.  
Businesses built up inventories at a slower rate in the fourth quarter, which held down output 
growth.  When you take out the effect of inventories, real final sales grew at over a 7 percent 
annual rate in the fourth quarter, the best performance for this measure since 1984. 
  At the San Francisco Fed, we see this momentum continuing to build, with real GDP 
expected to expand 4 percent this year and 4½ percent in 2012.  The main drivers of growth are 
improving household and business confidence, a banking and financial system that is rebuilding 
its strength, and pent-up consumer demand for durable goods such as cars and, eventually, 
housing.  I would describe the process under way as a positive feedback loop with improving 
economic conditions contributing to a strengthening of house prices and the financial system.  
This in turn helps ease the availability of credit, providing a boost to the economy.  This is 
exactly the opposite direction of the negative loop experienced during the financial crisis. 
Now 4 percent is a good, strong number and a welcome improvement over what we’ve 
seen the past several years.  But it’s short of the sizzling growth that took place after past severe 
recessions, such as the powerful snapback that occurred after the 1981–82 downturn, when the 
economy grew 7¾ percent in 1983.  What’s more, given the deep hole we fell into during and 3 
 
after the financial crisis of 2007–08, the current pace of growth means we still face a long slog 
before we get back to full employment and full utilization of the nation’s productive capacity. 
Why has the recovery been so weak for so long and why aren’t we getting the kind of 
rebound that we saw in the early 1980s?  To answer these questions, I think it’s important to 
understand the specific nature of the recession of 2007–09 and the lingering effects that have 
hampered economic performance during the recovery.  During the postwar period, most 
recessions occurred after the Fed tightened interest rates to counter rising inflation.  When the 
Fed reversed course and eased rates, the economy bounced back.  By contrast, the recent 
recession was the product of the worst housing bust and worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression.  Let’s not forget how perilously close we came to a meltdown of the financial 
system and how tight credit markets became.  Research shows that recessions caused by 
financial crises tend to be followed by slow, gradual recoveries.
2  Damage to the financial system 
makes it tough for households and businesses to get the credit they need to spend and invest.  It 
saps confidence and puts consumers and businesses into a defensive crouch. 
The combination of losses in housing and stock market wealth, the credit crunch, and the debt 
overhang, all of historic proportions, created a perfect storm for a massive consumer pullback.  
In 2008, inflation-adjusted personal consumption expenditures fell 1.9 percent as households 
clamped down on spending.  Households were shell-shocked by the decline in their net worth 
following the housing market meltdown and subsequent plunge in stock prices.  The first figure 
shows the ratio of household net worth to disposable personal income.  As you can see, the past 
15 years have seen swings in wealth that hadn’t occurred previously in the postwar period.  
When wealth rises, households feel richer and spend more.  When it falls, they feel poorer and 
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cut back.  And don’t forget—
consumer spending makes up 
nearly 70 percent of GDP.  The 
financial crisis occurred at a time 
when household debt had gone 
through the roof.  During the 
housing boom years, when it 
seemed that to get a loan you just 
needed to show up and sign your 
name, the ratio of household debt to disposable personal income surged from about 1 at the start 
of the decade to an all-time high of 1.3 in 2007.  Now, households are burdened with debt, face a 
weak labor market, and worry about saving for the future.  This is hardly a prescription for a 
rapid rebound in confidence and spending.
 3 
  The labor market and the elevated unemployment rate have rightfully been a focus of our 
attention.  In this regard, it’s important to stress two things: Conditions are looking better, but we 
have a long way to go before we return to health.  During the recovery, employers raised output 
by cranking up productivity instead of hiring additional workers.  The result has been a jobless 
recovery, the third time since the early 1990s that a recession has been followed by weak job 
gains. 
The stark contrast between the three most recent jobless recoveries and the V-shaped 
recoveries of the past is illustrated in Figure 2.  Even though we’re a year and a half into the 
expansion phase, we’ve seen virtually no net increase in payroll employment, consistent with the 
past two recoveries.  This compares with the typical pattern of about a 5 percent increase in jobs 
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experienced 18 months into 
postwar recoveries before the 
1990s.  During the last three 
months of 2010, the economy 
added about 130,000 jobs per 
month, real progress, but a pace 
insufficient to make much of a 
dent in the unemployment rate. 
I do think we will see 
sizable job gains in the months and years ahead, as shown by the dashed line in the figure.  
Indeed, these gains should be enough to bring the unemployment rate down significantly over 
time.  We project that the unemployment rate will fall gradually below 9 percent this year and to 
about 7½ percent toward the end of 2012.  But, when you’re coming down from an 
unemployment rate that reached 10 percent, such gains will seem disappointingly slow.  It would 
still leave us far from full employment, which we may not get back to until around 2014. 
But, I don’t want to be overly bleak in my comments.  Lately, we’ve seen a welcome 
acceleration in consumer outlays.  Real personal consumption expenditures rose at a 4.4 percent 
annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2010, the fastest growth rate since the first quarter of 2006.  
We hear reports of strong holiday sales and brisk traffic at shopping malls, auto dealers, hotels, 
and restaurants. 
Moreover, there is a silver lining to the sharp drop in consumer spending that occurred 
during the recession.  The fact that households curtailed spending so dramatically means that 
there is a lot of pent-up demand for cars and other durable goods.  The case of motor vehicles is 
Figure 2 
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instructive.  From 2006 to 2009, we saw annual sales of autos and light trucks plummet from 
more than 16½ million to less than 10½ million—a 37 percent decline over three years.  Sales 
fell well below the pace needed to keep the stock of vehicles growing along its trend.  This is  
illustrated in Figure 3, which 
shows U.S. light vehicle sales 
over the past 40 years, along with 
a rough estimate of the longer-
term trend.  As you can see, sales 
were well above trend during the 
first half of the 1990s, when 
housing wealth and easy credit 
fed a buying binge.  I don’t 
expect annual sales to shoot back up to 16 million overnight.  After all, the job market is still 
weak and confidence hasn’t yet fully recovered from the events of the past few years.  But it’s 
also clear that Americans haven’t yet abandoned the automobile.  Eventually they’ll need to 
replace those tired, run-down cars.  Motor vehicle sales are now running at about a 12½ million 
annual rate, about 2 million above the 2009 pace.  Over the next few years, I expect at least 
another sizable increase as we get back to more normal levels. 
  I expect the pattern of slow recovery that we see for products such as motor vehicles to 
eventually extend to housing, albeit with a longer lag.  The housing market was the center of the 
storm and it will take quite a while for it to right itself.  Although credit conditions are gradually 
improving, it’s still comparatively hard for prospective buyers to get mortgages, especially given 
how many mortgages are underwater.  The market is glutted with a huge inventory of unsold 
Figure 3 
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homes and foreclosures remain high, despite the legal and procedural problems highlighted by 
the “robo-signing” controversy.  House prices are still falling, with the CoreLogic Home Price 
Index registering a 5 percent decline in the year that ended in November.  We are beginning to 
see some improvement in sales volume, but construction remains at a very low level.  Lower 
unemployment, rising incomes, easier credit, and the process of household formation will 
eventually bring about a turnaround. 
Housing starts plunged even more steeply than auto sales, from a pace over 1.7 million 
units in 2005 to less than 450,000 in 2009.  This is shown in Figure 4.  The story is much the 
same as for autos.  House construction was way above trend during the housing boom.  This 
excess construction created a huge housing overhang that needs to be undone.  Since the housing 
crash, construction has come almost to a standstill.  With so little construction taking place, the 
overhang of available housing will dissipate.  Eventually, we will need to start building 
significantly more new homes to replace old demolished homes and meet the demand of new 
households.  But it will take some time before the economy gets a lot of help from housing 
construction.  And that’s a big 
change from past recessions.  
Ordinarily, housing is one of the 
sectors leading the way when the 
economy bounces back from 
recession.  In part, that’s for the 
reason that I already mentioned.  
The Fed typically adds monetary 
stimulus to fuel recovery, and 
Figure 4 
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housing is one of the most interest-sensitive sectors.  But, this time, it’s the housing market itself 
that is the problem.  Although low interest rates are helping the sector, they can’t yet overcome 
the fierce headwinds holding back a housing recovery. 
  Another explanation for a subdued recovery lies overseas.  The recent recession was truly 
global in nature, which meant we couldn’t export our way back to health.  In fact, trade flows 
collapsed following the financial crisis and the global recession, and they have only begun to 
recover.  The world’s advanced economies are generally expanding, but at only a moderate rate.  
Meanwhile, the European sovereign debt crisis and Japan’s continued economic struggles show 
that significant downside risks remain.  I expect that the debt problems of Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, and other countries will be managed without inflicting major harm on the U.S. 
economy.  But slow growth in Europe and other advanced economies suggests that we will see 
relatively moderate export gains in upcoming quarters. 
Inflation has been another area of concern for us.  This may be surprising to hear from the 
Fed, but my concern is not too much inflation, but rather too little.  Let me explain.  Most 
participants in the Fed’s policymaking body, the Federal Open Market Committee, or FOMC, 
see an inflation rate of about 2 percent or just a bit under that as being most consistent with the 
Fed’s dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability.  In 2008, the core inflation 
rate—which excludes volatile food and energy prices—was right at 2 percent.  But, with 
substantial slack in the economy, core inflation fell to 1.7 percent in 2009 and then to 0.8 percent 
last year.  This is the lowest reading over four quarters recorded in the 50 years these data are 
available.  Unfortunately, this disinflationary trend is continuing.  Over the second half of last 
year, core inflation was just 0.5 percent.  This pattern of continued disinflation is eerily, in fact, I 
might say ominously, reminiscent of Japan’s experience in the 1990s, when that country fell into 9 
 
chronic deflation and economic malaise from which it still hasn’t recovered.  But, before you 
accuse me of having slipped back into a depressing mode, I promise to return later to the reasons 
I think we can and will avoid Japan’s fate. 
  I’d like to turn to economic conditions in our region, which in some ways offer a 
concentrated example of what has happened in the nation as a whole.  This conference is about 
the West.  At the Fed, we think in terms of districts—that is, states served by a specific Federal 
Reserve Bank.  The San Francisco Fed’s 12
th District includes nine states: California, Oregon, 
Washington, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, Idaho, Alaska, and Hawaii.  Our District got walloped 
about as hard as any during the downturn, which is not surprising, given our dubious distinction 
as the region with the biggest housing boom in the nation followed by the most severe housing 
bust.  Declines in house prices in major western metropolitan areas such as Las Vegas and 
Phoenix, and smaller metro areas such as Merced in California’s Central Valley, have been as 
large as 50 to 60 percent. 
  One result of our oversized exposure to housing and the worse-than-average economic 
performance of recent years has been carnage in the labor market.  From the employment peak in 
December 2007 to the trough in December 2009, total nonfarm payroll employment fell nearly 9 
percent in the 12
th District compared with about 6 percent nationwide.  In December, Nevada’s 
14.5 percent unemployment rate was the highest of any state in the nation, followed by 
California at 12.5 percent. 
  Another result was some of the most severe state and local government fiscal crises in the 
nation.  Budget gaps for the upcoming fiscal year are expected to be slightly larger among 
District states than nationwide.  Nevada and California rank among the states facing the largest 
percentage shortfalls.  In California, the resulting spending cuts have been very dramatic and far 10 
 
bigger than reductions during prior fiscal crises in the early 1990s and early 2000s.  Between 
fiscal year 1991–92 and 1993–94, the cumulative cuts in general fund spending were 10 percent.  
In fiscal 2001–02, they were 1.7 percent.  By contrast, from fiscal year 2007–08 to 2010–11, 
California reduced spending by 19 percent, harsh medicine indeed. 
  Still, from a macroeconomic point of view, the region is clearly on the rebound.  The 
housing market appears to have stabilized.  As housing becomes less of a drag, other sectors of 
the regional economy are able to pull us forward.  In this regard, I’d like to focus on two areas in 
which the 12
th District has advantages compared with the rest of the nation: technology, and 
trade with China and other booming Asian economies.  Thanks to these advantages, there’s 
reason to expect that our region may grow faster than the nation as a whole in the years ahead.  
Just as we led the way down, so may we help lead the way up. 
High-tech encompasses computers and information technology more broadly, as well as 
related services.  It also includes biotechnology and other research-intensive, technologically 
advanced activities.  Broadly defined, tech accounts for about 10 percent of the nation’s overall 
economic activity.  But in California, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington, it’s in the range of 15 
percent or more.  And in the San Francisco Bay Area, information technology directly accounts 
for more than 20 percent of wage and salary income. 
  The recession badly hurt tech companies, largely because business spending on capital 
goods, including high-tech equipment and software, all but ground to a halt.  That spending 
bounced back in late 2009 and 2010 as hardware upgrades could simply no longer be deferred.  
In 2010, business spending on technology hardware and software rose over 13 percent, the best 
performance since 2000, at the tail end of the tech boom.  As a result, information technology 
has been one of the few sources of sustained employment growth.  In the 12
th District, IT-related 11 
 
jobs grew substantially faster than in the nation as a whole.  Furthermore, a pickup in the pace of 
job gains in the District’s IT manufacturing sector in the second half of 2010 signals that 
employment gains are likely to continue. 
  Trade is another area that was hit hard during the recession but presents a long-term 
opportunity for the West, thanks to our proximity to Asia, the world’s most dynamic economic 
region.  China and much of the rest of Asia have been bulwarks of growth throughout the 
recession and recovery.  While growth in Europe, the United States, and Japan has been sluggish, 
many emerging economies have bounced back quickly.  This is good news for western states.  
On the import side, many Asian goods enter the United States through Los Angeles/Long Beach, 
Oakland, Seattle, and other West Coast ports.  Receiving, storing, and transshipping those 
products provide a tremendous boost to our regional economy.  On the other side, exports to Asia 
as a share of GDP are almost twice as high in the nine states of the 12
th District than in other 
parts of the nation.  Nationwide, exports to Asia represented about 25 percent of total exports in 
the first 11 months of 2010.  In California, that figure was about 40 percent and in Washington 
State, the center of Boeing aircraft production, it was more than 50 percent. 
Interestingly, the geographical breakdown of our trade with Asia has changed over time.  
Since 1990, Asia’s share of the U.S. merchandise goods trade has remained roughly constant at 
25–30 percent of our exports and 35–40 percent of our imports.  What has changed is the relative 
role of China.  In 1990, China accounted for only 1 percent of U.S. exports and 3 percent of 
imports.  By 2009, U.S. exports to China had risen to 7 percent of total exports and imports from 
China had risen to 19 percent.  Correspondingly, the shares of Japan and the rest of Asia have 
declined.  China is even more important regionally.  California’s exports to China rose nearly 30 12 
 
percent in the first 11 months of 2010.  Export growth to China from District states other than 
California and Washington was more than 40 percent. 
  It’s fair to say then that we in the western United States have a big stake in China’s 
remarkable economic story.  Figure 5 compares the growth rates of per capita real GDP in China, 
Japan, Korea, and several other Asian countries in the decades after they achieved economic 
takeoff, following 
implementation of structural 
reforms.  China’s growth 
performance in the first decade 
after takeoff was not much higher 
than the 7–8 percent annual 
growth rates posted by Japan and 
Korea at similar stages of 
development.  However, in the 
second and third decades after 
takeoff, growth in those countries slowed as their economies matured.  Japan averaged 6 percent 
growth in the second decade after takeoff and 3.5 percent in the third decade.  By contrast, China 
has sustained high growth rates into the second and third decades, growing nearly 10 percent 
annually 30 years after takeoff. 
  Many questions important to our region arise from China’s growth.  For example, how 
will competition from China affect our advanced technology industries, such as solar equipment, 
as Chinese manufacturers continue to climb the value chain?  To what extent will U.S. product 
Figure 5 
Growth Miracle Redux 
 
Growth takeoff dates: Japan (1955), Korea (1967), Malaysia (1973), China 
(1979), India (1982). 












Average GDP per capita growth after growth takeoff 
%13 
 
and service providers be able to tap into the burgeoning Chinese consumer market?  If trends in 
these areas are favorable, the benefits to our region’s economy are likely to be substantial. 
  I’d like to close with a discussion of what the Fed is doing at this point in the economic 
cycle.  A natural question is, if we have solid growth, why has the Fed’s monetary policy 
remained so stimulative?  As you know, we have set our main short-term interest rate policy tool, 
the federal funds rate, at a target close to zero.  The FOMC stated that it expects to keep its fed 
funds target at that level “for an extended period.”  The Fed supplemented this near-zero fed 
funds rate by buying $1.7 trillion in longer-term Treasury securities, and debt and mortgage-
backed securities issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae, from late 2008 through 
early 2010.  In November last year, the Fed announced its intention to expand the size of its 
security holdings further by purchasing an additional $600 billion in longer-term Treasury 
securities by the middle of 2011.
4 
  I think the way to understand this is to distinguish between rates and levels.  The 
economy’s growth rate now is respectable and improving.  But, because the recession was so 
deep, the level of economic activity is still relatively low as measured by our utilization of labor 
and productive resources.  In other words, the economy still has enormous slack.  Millions of 
people could be put back to work and many more goods and services could be produced without 
igniting unwelcome inflation. 
  Another way to think about this is to look at the Fed’s statutory mandate.  Congress has 
assigned the central bank the goals of fostering maximum employment and price stability.  
Because the economy is weak and inflation has fallen close to zero, we are falling short on both 
counts.  The unemployment rate is far above the level that can be sustained without triggering 
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inflation.  Economists call that noninflationary rate the natural rate of unemployment.  I believe a 
number of factors associated with the crisis and recession have temporarily boosted the natural 
rate from its long-run trend of 5¼ percent to around 6–6½ percent.  This means we have a gap of 
between 2½ and 3 percentage points between where we are now and full employment.  On the 
price side, as I noted earlier, most FOMC participants define price stability as an inflation rate of 
just under 2 percent, after taking out volatile food and energy prices.  Recent core inflation 
readings have come in well below 1 percent, which is not far enough away from deflation.  So, 
with unemployment too high and inflation too low, the law regulating monetary policy impels 
the Fed to do what it can to move the economy back to desired levels of employment and 
inflation. 
  In fact, monetary policy models show that the federal funds rate should actually be 
around a negative 4 percent to achieve the ideal level of stimulus.
5  Obviously, that’s impossible.  
The federal funds rate is constrained by a number that to monetary policy is what the speed of 
light is to physics—in this case, zero.  We can’t push the federal funds rate below that zero lower 
bound.  In order to provide the right level of stimulus, the Fed has to look elsewhere. 
  That explains the Fed’s large-scale asset purchase program.  It is simply the pursuit of 
monetary policy by other means.  The Fed controls the fed funds rate, the interest rate banks 
charge each other for overnight loans.  The level of the fed funds rate ripples through the 
financial system and ultimately affects the levels of medium- and long-term interest rates, other 
asset prices, and thereby the economy.  The Fed’s purchases of longer-term securities have 
similar and, in some ways, even more direct effects.  By boosting demand for longer-term 
securities, Fed purchases push down rates at the longer end of the yield curve compared with 
where they would be otherwise.  And those lower rates help ease overall credit conditions, boost 
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asset prices, and stimulate economic activity.  Fed researchers estimate that by the second half of 
2012 these asset purchases will raise the level of real GDP almost 3 percent and contribute an 
incremental 3 million jobs to the economy.  Some 700,000 jobs will be generated just by the 
most recent phase of the program.  The unemployment rate is estimated to be about 1½ 
percentage points below where it would be absent the Fed’s asset purchases.
6  
  Many misconceptions surround the Fed’s large-scale asset purchases.  For example, 
commentators have equated it with the so-called quantitative easing programs pursued by the 
Bank of Japan in the past.  But the mechanisms are fundamentally different.  Under quantitative 
easing, the central bank buys short-term securities at volumes far above normal, flooding the 
banking system with reserves.  By contrast, the Fed’s large-scale asset purchases involve longer-
term securities and the mechanism of action is simple supply and demand.  By increasing 
demand for such securities, yields fall relative to where they would be without the Fed 
purchases.  The idea isn’t to build up reserves, but to directly push longer-term interest rates 
down. 
  Without this monetary stimulus, the recession would have likely been very much worse 
and the recovery might have failed to reach the escape velocity I referred to at the beginning of 
this talk.  Moreover, it has so far helped protect us from sliding into deflation as Japan did.  
Importantly, these policy actions have not damaged the public’s confidence in the Fed’s 
commitment to price stability.  Longer-term inflation expectations, whether measured by surveys 
of households or economists, or by prices paid in financial markets for protection from inflation, 
remain well anchored.  That said, it’s important to emphasize that when the right time comes, the 
Fed will reduce monetary stimulus.  A great deal of thought has gone into designing the proper 
ways to unwind the measures that are now in place, and I’m confident we’ll be able to do so 
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successfully and maintain price stability.  Meanwhile, we can finally say that we’re headed in the 
right direction and picking up speed, which makes giving speeches about the economy a pleasure 
again.  Thank you very much. 
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